common denominator is that they point to limitations on access to and use of knowledge or resources which hitherto have been considered to be in the public domain. Therefore, these catchwords generally are also understood as indicating an area of basic conflict between, on the one hand, the protection of the environment (i.e. natural resources) and of the (cultural) identity of people, as well as the promotion of developing countries and, on the other hand, the protection of intellectual, in particular of inventive activity, as well as the promotion of industrial innovation as part of techno-economic progress.
It is, however, precisely this broader background, which invites rash value judgements on issues, whose complexity and ramifications are intractable enough.
1 Therefore, rather than dealing with traditional knowledge and international intellectual property law in general, this paper will examine only issues of biodiversity-related traditional knowledge 2 and of patent law.
3
Biodiversity-related traditional knowledge may have a value of its own, and being knowledge, promise of its protection may be sought under the rules of intellectual property or by analogy to these rules. In general, however, biodiversity-related traditional knowledge derives its value from the genetic resources to which it applies. As these have their own market value and are subject to rules of law of their own, the following analysis will be subdivided accordingly in a first part on the defence or protection of traditional knowledge as such, and a second part on its activation in the context of the exploration or the exploitation of genetic resources. In both respects patents are the most important "counterparts" as they allow protection of inventions based on the discovery, isolation, modification or application of genetic resources. Also patent law is both the internationally most homogenous and the systematically most clearly structured field of intellectual property, and, for this doctrinal reason alone, best suited to illustrate conflicts of traditional property protection of intellectual goods with the new concept of narrowing the public domain by protecting traditional knowledge and the objects to which it applies.
1 A typical example of such a judgement, which is obviously circular, is the characterization of -arguably or actually illegitimate -patenting of genetic plant resources as "bio-piracy" or "misappropriation" (see G There can hardly be any piracy or misappropriation of subject-matter unless protection of this subjectmatter by title to property has been recognized first. 2 Traditional knowledge may also constitute or may be akin to copyrightable subject-matter, which is protected as intellectual property proper. Propositions to make a distinction between traditional knowledge relating "to the useful arts" (the term used by Art. 1, Sect. 8 Clause 8 of the US Constitution to determine the field of patent law) and "traditional cultural expression" (the concept followed by the World Intellectual Property Organization in its attempts to develop the basis for a system of protection) are not generally accepted (see J. Gibson, Intellectual Property System, Traditional Knowledge and the Legal Authority of Community, Eur. Int. Prop. Rev. 2004, 280) . For the purpose of the present paper, however, the distinction may well serve as a working hypothesis. 3 Thus, issues raised by plant variety protection are left aside, however important they are even in the age of gene technology (see for a clear presentation of the impact of plant variety protection and its relationship to patent protection CIPR (Commission on Intellectual Property Rights), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, London 2002, 59 ets eq.); however, the problem of farmers' rights also concerns patent protection. Also related, but not dealt with here is the protection of indications of geographical origin, see CIPR, loc. cit. at 87 et seq..
II. The Status of Traditional Knowledge
Under Existing International Patent Law
Defending Traditional Knowledge: Poor Romantics -Poor Economics

a) Improper appropriation under the rules for acquisition of patents
On balance, legal literature on the safeguard of traditional knowledge approaches it as an issue of defending, according to the exclusivity rules of intellectual property protection, the inherited forms of knowledge of indigenous peoples -generally those living in developing countries 4 against uncontrolled appropriation for business purposes by industrygenerally from developed countries. Whilst such an approach may be too narrow in view of the need for protection against other kinds of unauthorized use of traditional knowledge (rather than just that of indigenous peoples), 5 it points indeed to a minimum standard of passive protection of traditional knowledge, namely to the limits set by the rules on knowledge acquisition as provided for by intellectual property law. These rules are generally intended to ensure the functionality of the system of protection. In the case of patents this functionality is directed toward stimulating invention for the sake of technological innovation. To this effect appropriable knowledge must be separated from knowledge 4 These have also been the focus of WIPO which is, and which should remain, within (or should return to) the public domain.
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Art. 27
of the TRIPs-Agreement internationally harmonizes the relevant rules by stipulating that patent protection should only be granted to that which may properly be considered an invention, and among these only to those which are new, involve an inventive activity, and are industrially applicable. The selective effect of these four conditions of patentability varies, first, according to the nature of the subject-matter for which protection is claimed, and, second, according to national law and practice, because TRIPs Members may implement the standards differently.
Thus, in the first respect, the concept of invention, which, as regards mechanical inventions, is normally of only marginal importance, has become the crucial distinguishing factor in biotechnology. Biotechnological subject-matter may, indeed, represent a mere discovery of substances found in nature rather than an invention, the latter being defined as an instruction of how to achieve a technical result by operation of the forces of nature.
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However, the isolation of such substances and their presentation in a form ready for use may transform the discovery into an invention.
8
Whilst the distinction may be a fine one, and may be controversial both in concreto and in the general context of biotechnology patenting, it raises issues of the polito-economic definition of patent protection in general rather than of the determination of the status of traditional knowledge in particular.
Therefore, it will not be dealt with here on its merits.
9
In the second respect, however, traditional knowledge may be directly at stake. Indeed, whether traditional knowledge may be appropriated by way of taking out patents will 6 See R. (Serotoninrezeptor/Eli Lilly -discovery of selective linkage of compound to receptor no invention). 9 Note, however, that the delimitation of the scope of patent protection also determines the pre-emptive or non-pre-emptive effects vis-à-vis the use and exploitation of traditional knowledge (see text infra at n. 21), and the opportunity and legitimacy of benefit sharing, see infra 2 c).
largely depend on how national law defines the standards of novelty and inventive activity, which condition the grant of protection to inventions. Thus, whilst, as regards novelty, the general rule is that any prior art defeats the patentability of an invention, 10 national laws may exclude knowledge from the relevant prior art, which has not been disclosed in writing, but only orally or by use and has been so disclosed only abroad, 11 the reason being that bringing knowledge, which is not generally available or accessible, to public attention by patenting is meritorious enough.
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Clearly, under such a national rule, foreign traditional knowledge, if not sufficiently documented in publicly available literature, may become the subject of such alienation/appropriation. And yet, it would be unwise to ask, as a matter of principle, for a modification of such a "loose" definition of prior art/novelty, 13 let alone to ask for an international harmonization imposing a strict standard of novelty based on a broad definition of relevant prior art, since it may precisely be the developing countries that have an interest in a flexible standard of novelty.
14 10 See for example Art. 54 of the Convention for the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention, available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar54.html#A54), which reads in relevant parts "(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art. (2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application". This standards is adhered to throughout Europe and in most African and Latin American jurisdictions. 11 This is the case in the USA, see 35 U.S. C 102, which reads in relevant part: "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for the patent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in However, the novelty requirement will impede patenting of inventions based on traditional knowledge only if the invention, as claimed, is identically anticipated by a teaching of traditional knowledge -most likely a rare instance given that the invention frequently will represent an adaptation or a transformation of (possibly ill-defined) traditional knowledge.
By contrast, the requirement of an inventive activity or of non-obviousness of the invention by reference to the prior art as a whole 17 should constitute the greater obstacle to concerned with patenting conditions on their markets than with those existing on foreign markets? Note also that patenting on the basis of traditional knowledge does not normally foreclose access to markets by products of traditional knowledge (see infra text at n. 21); the situation is different as regards designs, trademarks, and, possibly, copyright to the extent that traditional cultural expression is appropriated. 15 The latter, in particular, are a concern of patent protection in general as it is extended to gene technology, regardless of where knowledge of the presumed properties of genes is derived from. Therefore, it has been adopted in Europe concomitantly with such extension of protection, 25 and, if not already existent, it may be introduced by developing countries with respect to their territories in accordance with Art. 30 TRIPs Agreement.
c) Defensive acquisition of patents for traditional knowledge
The upshot of the preceding considerations then is that traditional knowledge is not so much put in jeopardy by illegitimate appropriation through patents as by economic substitution through knowledge, which has been developed more or less directly on its basis. The threat of substitution is all the greater as such derived knowledge may be more competitive in that it is -presumably most of the time -scientifically-enhanced knowledge, which may be and generally is exploited industrially both as regards production and distribution. Reactions to this real threat are of various kinds.
One such reaction is to make use of the existing intellectual property system as shaped by the TRIPs-Agreement. Whilst, at least in some instances of technology-related traditional 23 But see WIPO, Intellectual Property Needs, loc. cit., p. 222. Under patent systems attributing the patent to the person who is first to file (see infra n. 28) a new invention with the patent office (which he/she legitimately possesses), an exception to the exclusivity is frequently admitted for those who actually and legitimately practiced the same invention before the application was filed, see Sect. 12 German Patent Act. The purpose of this exception is to accommodate for the social costs resulting from the enforcement of absolute exclusivity, particularly in view of the legitimacy of keeping new knowledge secret (patenting is an option, not an obligation; trade secret protection for patentable knowledge is generally recognized as an alternative, see for a discussion Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470 (1974)). However, prior user rights are generally recognized only with respect to the territory of prior use, meaning that they may benefit indigenous people only on their local markets, not abroad. 24 See for instance Art. But the point to be made here is that such marks also may establish product fidelity and protect against loss of reputation resulting from the use of the designation of traditional knowledge for derivative products, very much like trademarks are used to prolong product fidelity after expiration of patents for pharmaceuticals. 27 The difficulty will be less for medicinal products, see the Chinese example of handling applications even for examined patents, as reported by Chr. Heath, S. Weidlich, loc. cit., Int. Prop. Qu. 2003 at 90 et seq.
(stressing that in China traditional medicine is a well established mainstream art); however, it may be doubtful whether it really represents traditional knowledge deserving a separate status such as indigenous knowledge, see infra n. 99; Generally the disclosure requirements of patent law (Art. 29 TRIPs Agreement), if handled properly in accordance with their public purpose, should pose serious hurdles for easy patenting of uncodified knowledge. The disclosure requirement represents, indeed, a part (however imperfectly put into operation) of the quid pro quo of the grant of exclusive rights: The exclusivity is granted to allow enterprises to abandon secrecy; the value of disclosure as a quid pro quo lies in the facilitation of the development of both substitute knowledge and improvements, see R. 
d) Sui generis protection as a sustainable outer line of defence?
Some of these problems may be overcome by appropriate adaptation of domestic patent laws and procedure. 30 However, politically speaking, that may not even be desirable, since the availability of any "adapted" patent protection might prove not only to the benefit of domestic or indigenous applicants, but also to the benefit of those whom a (developing) country might wish to exclude from protection, since international convention law excludes any reservation of protection to nationals only (Article 2 Paris Convention). Obviously also, a sui generis approach, however well conceived as an appropriately adapted "full property"-regime, 34 will at best serve local trade to the extent that there is demand for traditional subject-matter as such. 35 The substitution problem, however, will remain unchanged, and any hopes of conservation effects are misplaced per se. Property titles cannot preserve knowledge that becomes obsolete or that falls into oblivion. Property is a market institution, not a conservation measure. 36 It may be based on rationales other than setting incentives and rewards. 37 But in the absence of markets, where offer and demand actually meet, it is literally worthless. More precisely, where property is supposed to operate in a museum rather than on a market, all it will produce are high individual costs and few social gains.
This, of course, is pushing the argument to its extreme. To the extent that traditional knowledge is actually traded or at least put to use as it is, available or adapted forms of intellectual property may serve a defensive purpose as protection against acts of passing off non-genuine products or services. Possibly it may also help codify and formalize such knowledge, if that is compatible with its nature, and it may constitute a means to ensure its recognition and respect. 38 In this regard, there is ample support for it also in public 34 Meaning property carrying an obligation "to preserve and maintain" the traditional knowledge, see the concepts discussed WIPO, Revised Version, loc. cit. (2000)). This is simply confusing the operation of protection with its rationale, which, at least in the case of trademarks, is to encourage investment in market penetration and distribution. Likewise, indications of origin are not protected for the sake of preserving products of the past, but to allow competition on the merits in trade, i.e. investment in quality, which is to be recouped from the market. In short, intellectual property is an instrument of dynamic competition, not a stand-still arrangement. 38 For an account and a juxtaposition of the arguments on how and why to protect traditional knowledge see (7)).
The Biodiversity Convention has its own financial resources and mechanism mainly "to enable developing country parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions....." (Art. 20 (2)).
46
It also has its own organisational structure in order to meet the long term needs of environmental protection measures relating to biodiversity, and to access and benefit-sharing strategy, which may be part of their national biodiversity strategy and action plan, and in identifying the steps involved in the process of obtaining access to genetic resources and sharing benefits" (No. 12). To this effect they propose a complete scheme of administrative organisation and tasks, of distribution of substantive responsibilities between granting and receiving States, users and providers, of how to 46 Even in view of the undisputable fact that developing countries need to be enabled to protect the environment, and that the latter is a matter of common concern to all Parties it is surprising to read Art. 20 (4) of the Convention: "4. The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account the fact that economic and social development and eradication of poverty are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties". Given the additional claim of benefit-sharing in the commercial exploitation of the good to be protected, namely biodiversity, this provision underscores the ambivalence of the communitarian approach underlying the Convention. 47 involve "stakeholders", of the procedure for granting access and ensuring benefit-sharing, and of the terms and modalities of access, of prior informed consent and benefit-sharing, as well as an indicative list of "mutually agreed terms" of the arrangements between Contracting Parties). As if all this and provisions on incentives, accountability in implementing access and benefit-sharing arrangements were not enough, "Elements for Material Transfer Agreements" in the form of a contract check list are suggested, and modalities of monetary or non-monetary benefit-sharing are detailed.
b) Intellectual property issues
Intellectual property comes into the picture of this bureaucratic paradise at several points.
(i) Art. 8 lit j of the Convention extends the duty of environmental protection to traditional knowledge of indigenous and local communities, insofar as it is relevant
for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The provision even establishes a duty to promote its "wider application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge...." and to "encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge". This seems to be an obligation on the Contracting Parties in its own right, which must be distinguished from rules on access to and benefit-sharing as they apply when traditional knowledge is necessary for the identification and understanding of genetic resources and, therefore, is used in conjunction with the latter as "associated traditional knowledge".
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Even though the two kinds of traditional knowledge are not really separable on a general level, in the following text traditional knowledge will only be considered under the aspect of access to and benefit-sharing in the use or exploitation of genetic resources. 50 It is a paradise in permanent evolution, see Bonn Guidelines, sub. 53 Basically the consent is given via an administrative act -the prospecting permit -by the competent national authorities, but it may become more difficult when "stakeholders", such as indigenous peoples and local communities, have to approve of prospecting. Still, it relates to the tangible "phenotypes" of genetic resources. 54 This vicious circle, which is noted also by G. Srividhy, in K. Hill, T. Takenaka, K. Takeuchi (eds.), loc. cit. at p. 230, is well-known from trade-secret licensing, where it is overcome by the parties first agreeing on duties of confidentiality obliging them to maintain confidentiality even in case of failure of the negotiations; breach of such agreements may be sanctioned by penalties and the grant of liquidated damages; however, this may not be a reliable mechanism in the context of bio-prospecting, where transactions may involve many and/or inexperienced people. 55 In particular, it may protect and complement customary rules, which, in view of their proper way of functioning, their perception and precarious status cannot effectively safeguard traditional knowledge, see the applicant for a patent should fully disclose in his patent application both the genetic resources and the traditional knowledge, which, in conjunction with genetic resources or independently, constitute the subject-matter of or have been used in the development of his invention.
57
This petitum seems to be quite innocent as, in patent law, the description of the state of-the-art against which the invention has to be assessed, is both a formal requirement and good practice, and as such mentioning the contribution made by others to the invention seems simply to represent the respect due to the moral right(s) of the holder(s) of such knowledge. .000 € over the life time of the patent, that protection has to be sought worldwide, and that patent agents and, subsequently, patent examiners are engineers, who are not trained to check whether prior informed consent has been duly obtained under the law(s) of one or more distant countries and from the proper owners (so that additional legal advise becomes necessary), it should become clear that the disclosure requirement raises more than simply an issue of practicality. 64 65 See recital 27 EU Directive on biotechnological inventions, supra n. 25, which reads: "..... if an invention is based on biological material of plant or animal origin or if it uses such material, the patent application should, where appropriate, include information on the geographical origin of such material, if known;..... this is without prejudice to the processing of patent applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents". Note that this is not only a non-binding, but also a rather restrictive formulation in view of the difficulties of precisely locating the origin of genetic resources, and the uncertainty as to where, how, and to what extent it has been used in the process of invention.
would mark the transformation of the patent system from an institution for the grant of private property rights into an auxiliary instrument of administrative environment protection.
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It is for this reason that a globally uniform disclosure rule, which reaches beyond technological information, is hard to foresee. In addition, the differences in national access regulations and patent procedures 67 alone would seem to stand in the way of a patent-law supported control of the importance of the genetic resources used as a basis for the requirement of consent and benefit-sharing, of the materiality of the consent, and of the adequacy of benefit-sharing.
It is, therefore, no surprise that, at the level of the World Trade Organisation, where the same issue is debated, only little progress has been made as regards the nature and scope of a technical disclosure requirement, and even less as regards a transformation of the patent system into an instrument of environmental and developmental policy by way of an extension of the disclosure requirement to evidence of prior informed consent and, ultimately, to evidence of benefit sharing.
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Indeed, what is really needed is a thorough empirical economic investigation into the question of how much of an extra-load can reasonably be carried by the patent system without deterring its use.
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Such an investigation should be extended to examining the question of whether the 66 Much to the regret of some fervent advocates of the disclosure requirement, even India has refrained from taking this last step, and is satisfied with a technical disclosure requirement, see N.S. Gopalakrishnan, loc. cit. Eur. Int. Prop. Rev. 2005 at 17 et seq.. After all, the prior informed consent primarily concerns the impact a request for access to genetic resources may have on bio-diversity rather than the commercial implications of the applicant's innovation project as such. 67 The WIPO Technical Study, supra n. 64, has not gone into the different problems the disclosure requirement will raise, on the one hand, under an examination system (such as in the USA, in the EU or in Japan) and, on the other, under a mere registration system (such as existing in most developing countries, but also in major developed countries such as France or Italy). 68 
c) Systems friction
(i) It may very well be that within WTO-TRIPs, either expressly or implicitly, much of the excess load of the biodiversity-related disclosure requirements for patent applications may be negotiated away so as to make them compatible with proper operation and functionality of the system of protection, and, therefore, acceptable within TRIPs.
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This, indeed, is what happened or is likely to happen with other stumbling blocks, which developing countries and the defenders of biodiversity and traditional knowledge have rolled in the way of patent-protected innovation in order 70 It has even been suggested that national patent offices should report to the authorities of the countries of origin on the patent applications made, see WIPO, Technical Study, supra n. 64 sub. No. 81. This is surprising not only as regards costs of such extra work, but also as regards patent law, since, within certain time limits, patent applications are made publicly available anyway. 71 See infra sub c) (iii). 72 to bring their interests to bear. Thus, whilst fears that exclusive rights might in turn be applied to block the use of the original plant genetic resources have apparently not been dispelled, 74 the distinction between that source and the patentable invention as such seemed to be solid enough to allow the conclusion and, actually, the entry into force of the FAO-supported International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR). 75 Likewise, the US concerns that the Biodiversity Convention's Art. 16 on technology transfer might ultimately be used to impose rules of compulsory licensing for patented biotechnological inventions seems to be exaggerated in view of the flexible and limiting language of the provision. 76 At the very least, the language leaves enough room for less rigorous implementation by agreement. 77 In fact, Art. 16 (3) does not even appear to represent the threat that must be feared most, since the "developing countries which provide genetic resources" and, therefore, wish to have "access to and transfer of the technology that makes use of those resources" already possess the leverage power to obtain technology access and transfer by virtue of their power to control access to the genetic resources and to request benefit-sharing in non-monetary form. 78 (ii) The true problems of the relationship between protecting biodiversity, promoting development and protecting inventions, therefore, do not lie in the texts of the relevant conventions, agreements, and statutes, but in the frictions resulting from the interaction between the regulatory systems they establish. Fortunately, a discussion of these frictions is well beyond the scope of this paper. This is obvious, for the question why and how it may be expected that, by claiming participation in the benefits accruing from patent protected innovation, precisely those effects on biodiversity may be compensated for of which the incentive-and profit-oriented patent-competition-innovation system is accused 79 ? This is a problem of environment protection, and, therefore, not of my domain. However, as a matter of logic one would expect a counter-productive result. Indeed, if there are any effects to be expected at all from this interaction, then it would appear that they take the form of synergies in the operation of the systems, meaning that the effects will be mutually reinforcing, and, therefore, detrimental to the very objectives of the Biodiversity Convention. Rather then contributing to the preservation of genetic diversity in situ as a self-sustained and evolving common resource, the combined effects of, on the one hand, providing incentives through patents and, on the other, giving way to the commercial interests of holders (and alleged protectors) of genetic resources through a promise of benefit-sharing, are likely to be technological concentration and commercial selectivity ultimately leading to a substitution of the use of the original genetic resources and its associated traditional knowledge by innovative "industrial" products and processes. Whether this is desirable from a development perspective, and if so, how much of the associated wealth creation will occur in developing countries and actually produce general welfare again is a matter outside my expertise.
Anyway, whatever beneficial effects may occur, they obviously depend on the efficient functioning of the patent system as a form of protection of the goose, which lays the golden eggs, in which a share is sought. Whether the patent system can hold such promise in general is doubtful enough. 80 Certainly, however, the Biodiversity Convention's rules on access and benefit-sharing do all but improve its operation. 79 See references supra n. 36. 80 granted by patent law should allow enterprises to reap the rewards which the market offers for the inventions made through investment in the development of new and non-obvious knowledge. To this effect, the exclusivity is granted evenly for all inventions so that investors may decide freely into which inventive activity to invest.
In this sense, a patent system is a policy neutral, market driven instrument to promote innovation in general. Framework regulations of the market, however, may influence that choice to the extent that they predetermine costs and profit potentials.
Clearly, the higher the costs of an innovation, including the costs of patenting, and the more public or private taxes are levied on potential profits, the higher the profit potential itself must be.
Therefore, subjecting access to genetic resources to administrative burdens and prospecting fees, introducing onerous obligations of disclosure of genetic sources and of consent, setting restrictive standards for the making of agreements on benefit sharing, 82 and requiring such benefit-sharing on both the State or regional and the local or communal level, necessarily means that the direction of innovation becomes biased toward inventions which promise high commercial yields. To the extent then that such innovation depends on or is at least influenced by the availability, the quality, and the actual scope and enforceability of patent exclusivity as a means to actually realize the profits expected, the perverse effect of a biodiversity-specific subsystem of patent protection will be, that due to its increased costs and burdens, it will in turn reinforce the tendency toward selective high-yield inventive activity.
Commercially promising inventions thus become specifically promoted by both the general, cost intensive regulatory regime of biodiversity-related innovation and by the additional requirements which are introduced on its account into the patent system, and they are so promoted to the detriment of less rewarding or more risky, but possibly more advanced or more technically/pharmaceutically valuable inventions.
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Likewise, large enterprises, which are better equipped to handle the administrative complexities of the procedure for the grant of access, to negotiate and manage the agreements on benefit-sharing, and to take out patents in accordance with the additional disclosure requirements, are favoured over smaller enterprises.
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Whilst the former effect will not remain without (the afore-mentioned counterproductive)
impact on biodiversity; the latter is likely to affect the attainment of developmental objectives. It seems, indeed, that the obsession of developing countries and of many defenders of biodiversity with big enterprise has possibly made them forget how much a policy of access control, which is focussed on benefit-sharing, may actually hurt smaller domestic industry. It is less able to efficiently handle the complex and burdensome system and to promise and actually make comparable profits on a global scale, but, nevertheless, it is subject to the same rules that apply to large foreign enterprises. has little legitimacy and easily comes into conflict with the rationale of the patent system. It is, indeed, a problematic approach to give the Nation States, as a matter of global interest in biodiversity, full sovereign control over the genetic resources which happen to be 83 At the limit, necessary inventions, such as those for orphan drugs, will not be made at all, as has been officially recognized in recital 18 of the EU-Directive on biotechnological inventions, supra n. 25. Note also that a biodiversity-specific sub-system of patent protection may produce a technology bias towards reliance on other technologies, which may or may not be more valuable as regards the substance of the inventions. 84 As evidenced by the examples of benefit-sharing agreements typically cited, see supra n. 42.
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This follows not only from the non-discrimination/national treatment-principle (see Art. 3 TRIPsAgreement), but also from the environmentalist objective of the CBO to safeguard biodiversity and its sustainable use (Art. 1): all must abide by the rules or else the objective will not be attained (see also the first recitals of the Preamble of the CBD stressing the common responsibility in the interest of humankind). 86 For examples see references supra n. 42; such local cooperation in the very development of biodiversitydependent innovation certainly merits to be supported as a matter of technology transfer and nonmonetary ex ante benefit-sharing.
found within their territory, and to expect that they will exercise this control with a view to safeguarding this global interest. It is a no less problematic idea to seek to justify this approach by analogy to sovereign control over mineral resources simply because both are natural resources.
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Both physical and territorial control essentially concern genetic resources only as phenotypes. By contrast, such territorial control is less directly related to the genotypes, which genetic resources embody, since these have a distinct value as information on genetic functions. It is, indeed, not the information support, but the genetic information as such which goes into a biotechnological invention, and it is not the preservation of genetic resources in situ or ex situ, but the inventive effort, however big or small, 88 which creates the plus value and establishes the interest of protecting and exploiting the invention.
Moreover, as the commercial value of the patented invention is determined by the demand which exists or which the patentee succeeds to attract by distributional efforts on the market, there is no direct correlation between the genetic input, however direct and important, and the "monopoly" power or the profitability of the biotechnological invention.
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Mandatory benefit-sharing, therefore, runs the risk of a lack of sufficient basis in a quid pro quo, and the more so the more commercially successful a patented invention is.
For all these reasons it would seem that genetic resources, which are used in the invention process, may not, as such, justify benefit-sharing, but only if their utility is duly supported by associated traditional knowledge. . Note that analogies to employer/employee relations regarding inventions are misplaced, first, because there is no universal principle as to how these relations should be regulated -to the contrary, national laws differ widely -and second, because the employee, by producing an invention, makes an individual, non-routine contribution to technological progress. the recognition of the honour of discoverers of laws of nature or of authors of scientific theories, the claim to benefit-sharing is less convincing in all three cases, albeit for reasons which are not entirely the same. 90 In the case of traditional knowledge the connecting factor for benefit-sharing is a collective and rather diffuse merit, which typically (and literally) comes through tradition, i.e. is inherited, whereas discoveries and theories are essentially personal and innovative achievements.
Benefit-sharing based on some use of traditional knowledge is unlimited in time as concerns the past, and also as regards the future. It will not expire as the patent lapses, but only as the profits come to exhaustion. , who equates traditional knowledge with know how and argues for benefit-sharing via a local manufacturing requirement (which is, however, economically costly, contrary to the rationale of global patent protection and incompatible with the ubiquitous nature of traditional knowledge once it has been transformed into scientific knowledge). 91 The open-endedness of benefit-sharing raises many issues, such as whether benefit-sharing is still justified once the patents (which?) have expired, simply because the products are still successfully sold; should benefit-sharing also continue, if the products are sold under a trademark (whose attractiveness is due to the marketing efforts of the enterprise), or if they are sold in competition with identical/similar, but derived generic products, and should the manufacturer/distributors of such derived generic products be included in benefit-sharing? etc.. 92 See supra text at n. 31 et seq..
(iv) This systems friction is not only a philosophical one between conservation and progress, or a pecuniary one in that an additional and perpetual financial burden is laid on the patent system. Rather it affects the very rationality of promoting invention and innovation by exclusive rights, which are specifically limited in time and scope.
The idea underlying the patent system is that from the permanent flow of knowledge a segment may be carved out in view of the particular new use to which the inventor has brought the knowledge, but that after a while that piece of knowledge must fall back into generally available knowledge so as to contribute to the accumulation of human knowledge and to form part of the basis from which, by competition for inventions, new ideas may be developed for new uses. 93 The patent system, therefore, is not simply crafted like a parasite on the public domain, but symbiotically lives as much for it as it lives from it, and whilst the public domain is much broader than what inventions may contribute to it, its rationale as well goes a long way in support of technical progress. It is, indeed, based on the idea that knowledge creation is a sequential and cumulative process where the merit of new contributions is derived from prior insights, discoveries, and inventions, It is in view of this utilitarian, but longstanding and, indeed, inherited rationale alone that knowledge should not light-handedly be withdrawn from the public domain, (obviously, by including communal people, the concept has been extended as a matter of broadening the scope of relevant traditional knowledge, and possibly in view of an objective of environment/biodiversity protection, but at the cost of a loss of legitimacy in terms of fundamental rights and claims to non-inclusion in the public domain). 99 It is not easy to distinguish on a conceptual level Chinese or Indian medicinal or agricultural knowledge from traditional knowledge that exists in many parts of Europe, and which relates to viniculture, beerbrewing, cheese production or, in fact, to homeopathic pharmacology; this similarity is best evidenced by proposals to grant traditional knowledge protection by indications of geographic origin, or by certification marks, see supra n. 26; Kur, and Kur, Knaak in v. Lewinski, loc. cit. at p. 63, 221 et seq..
III. Conclusion
It is conceded that preserving the purity of the patent system is not a principle of practical politics nor would it be a sound guide for interpreting and applying the law. The TRIPsAgreement itself, however "protectionist" in nature, recognizes the interdependence between a market-oriented intellectual property system and market regulation in the interest of public policy. Whilst it is an open question, how flexible the TRIPs Agreement really is in this regard, it will not escape the claims "for the Establishment of a Development Agenda" which the World Intellectual Property Organisation actually has to face.
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The Biodiversity Convention's intellectual property rules point in the same direction. It is also to be welcomed that, within TRIPs, the various disclosure requirements, which have been formulated under the CBD, are not considered as a controversial issue that must be dealt with as a matter of trade policy, but as a problem of how to legally accommodate for political claims, which, as such, are founded in global socio-economic disparities. Such openness holds promise of a gradual transformation of the TRIPs framework of international intellectual protection into a law-based ordering of property, as distinguished from the pressure mechanism of (bi-lateral) TRIPs-plus policies.
However, to assert that the TRIPs-Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity may be implemented in a "mutually supportive" way, is rather misleading in view of the systemic conflicts between the exclusivity-based promotion of innovation, the privileged participation in its profit potential, and the ecologically motivated conservation of biodiversity in open nature. Given that, in addition, the developmental strategies underlying biodiversity-related patent policies of developing countries are not even consistent with their general patent policy -after all the former, to achieve their purpose, require strong and broad titles of exclusivity whereas the latter, in the interest of competitive follower strategies and of easy access to high technology, tends to favour soft 100 WIPO General Assembly, Thirty-First(15th Extraordinary)Session, Geneva, September 27 to October5 and narrow protection -, would it not have been more advisable to seek to achieve each policy objective separately in accordance with its proper requirements and possibilities?
The specific causes and needs of safeguarding biodiversity as a matter of protecting the environment, just as the particular causes and needs of pursuing a definite developmental strategy with a view to improve socio-economic standards of living, are only loosely related to the broad reasons underlying patent protection as an incentive system for inventive activity in general. In fact, much of biodiversity-related innovation may not even meet the needs of developing countries, let alone those of indigenous peoples, and still be socially desirable.
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Whilst it may not be illegitimate per se to seek to take advantage from the bargaining opportunities offered by territorial control over genetic resources or by locally existing, and generally vulnerable, associated traditional knowledge, it would seem that such legitimacy is best maintained by adequately limiting the advantages sought, and by consistently defining the means used 102 strictly in view of and by reference to the achievement of the public policy objectives that give substance to such legitimacy claims in the first place.
